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WILLS--PUBLIC

POLICY-REPUGNANT

PROVISIONS-APPEALABLE

Executor vs. Clarke, et al.-No. 13733Decided February 24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The will of Viola A. Clarke provided, "In case my son, Eugene
W. Clarke's present wife is dead, or has otherwise ceased to be his wife"
that the said son was to have one-third of the estate. There was a
further provision that "In case my son Eugene W. Clarke's wife is still
living and is still his wife at the time of my death, then I hereby, give,
devise and bequeath to my son, Eugene W. Clarke, $5,000.00 and no
more."
The District Court held these provisions in the will void as
contrary to public policy and repugnant to public morals and as tending
to interfere with the marital relation. The question is also raised as
to whether an executor who files a petition for construction of a will
where there is no contest or caveat over the will has an appealable
interest in the matter.
1. The provisions in the will with reference to the devises and
bequeaths to the son are valid and are not contrary to public policy,
nor repugnant to public morals.
2. The executor had the right to file a petition for a construction
as to the terms and validity of the will and is entitled to have an adverse
decision reviewed in the Supreme Court. It was not necessary that a
caveat or contest be filed. Proceedings to review an adverse decision of
the lower court lies not only where a caveat or contest is filed against
a will, but also an adverse decision on a petition for construction of the
terms of the will.
3. On the latter question the decisiori of the Supreme Court was
unanimous, but on the first question of the validity of the devises and
bequeaths to the son, Mr. Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
INTEREST--Clarke as

Justice Holland dissent.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC UTILITIES-ELECTRIC POWER
-METHOD
OF ESTABLISHING RATE-The Glenwood Light and

Water Company et al. vs. City of Glenwood Springs-No.
13641-DecidedMarch 2, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The Public Service Company owns a hydroelectric generating
plant seven miles from Glenwood Springs. The Glenwood Light and
Water Company is a public utility owning a hydroelectric plant at
Glenwood Springs operated by water used by the city and supplies electric current to the citizens of Glenwood Springs. The Glenwood Light
and Water Company is unable to furnish sufficient current at peak
demand and purchases additional current from the Public Service Company. Prior to 1926, the Glenwood Company owned the transmission
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line from the city limits to the plant of the Public Service Company and
purchased current delivered at the plant and assumed the line loss in
transit. In 1926 the Public Service Company rebuilt the line under
contract with the Glenwood Company whereby the Public Service
Company was to have sole ownership of the first mile leading from the
plant and the balance of the line was to remain the property of the
Glenwood Company and the Public Service Company was given a 20year lease on that part of the line retained by the Glenwood Company
and was to pay therefor $20.00 a year and taxes, patrol and maintain
it and deliver current at the city limits or city gate of Glenwood Springs.
The Public Service Company was to have the use of this part of the
line as a part of its transmission line supplying a number of towns, all
lying beyond Glenwood Springs, in which it served consumers directly.
Early in the year 1933, complaint being made to the Public Utilities Commission that the rates charged by the Glenwood Company were
excessive, and in the course of the proceedings evidence relative to the
value of the properties was offered. One of the considerations being as
to whether or not the value of the 5.28 miles of transmission lines leased
should be included in the valuation in determining the rate basis. The
commission held that it should be included.
In the District Court on review of the commission's findings, the
District Court held that such value was improperly included in the rate
base.
1. The test of whether the value of any given property shall be
included in the rate base of a public utility i's whether it is used and
useful in supplying the commodity or service that the utliity has undertaken to furnish. If it is used and useful it is properly included; if not,
it must be excluded.
2. Property may be owned by a utility, but if it is not used by
or useful to it in fulfilling its obligations to the public then such property cannot be included in the base for rate-making purposes.
3. A utility may lease property and if it is used by it and useful
in carrying out its obligations to the public, the rental paid for such
property is a proper overhead charge to be borne by the utility customers, and to be equitably allocated to them.
4. There is no conflict in the evidence as to the use of the line
and the evidence failed to show the line in question to be used by, and
useful to, the Glenwood Company and the Public Utilities Commission
exceeded its jurisdiction in permitting the valuation of the line in question to be included in the rate base.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents.
MINING RIGHTS-UNPATENTED OVERLAPPING CLAIMS-LANDLORD
AND TENANT-ESTOPPEL-Kenney vs. Eccer-No. 13615-

Decided February 24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Action for possession of and to quiet title to unpatented mining
claims. The defendants' location, dated June 10, 1930, covered land
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previously located by the plaintiffs' grantors on which plaintiffs had
failed to keep their location alive by failure to do required assessment
work prior to the location made by defendants. A lease dated June 18,
1930, was granted by plaintiffs to defendants covering a patented claim
and included the unpatented claims of the plaintiffs.
The real issue was whether defendants were estopped from making
their location as against the plaintiffs by reason of having accepted the
lease and taken possession which arose out of the relation of landlord
and tenant.
HELD: *That plaintiffs had failed, at their peril, to keep their locations alive, that the land was open to location when located by defendants, that the trial court determined that the defendants were in possession under such location made on land open to location before the
relation of landlord and tenant existed, that the defendants were not
estopped by subsequently entering into such relationship, and that there
was not sufficient evidence to justify disturbing the findings of the trial
court.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Burke, sitting for Mr. Chief Justice Campbell, and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
DEEDS-BOUNDARY LINES ESTABLISHED BY PAROL AGREEMENTCONFLICTING EVIDENCE-Eisele vs. Barnhart-No.1365 2-Decided February 24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Barnhart contracted to sell Eisele a tract of land described as "The
A surveyor was
south one acre of block numbered eighteen (18)."
called in and fixed the northerly boundary line. Eisele then constructed
a permanent fence on that boundary line. Barnhart then built a new
house north of Eisele's property on what was supposed to be her own
property. The deed conveying the property also called for "The south
one acre of block numbered eighteen (18) ." Barnhart then offered her
new property for sale and then found out that, if Eisele owned one
acre, the north boundary line of Eisele's property would go through
the center of Barnhart's new house so Barnhart asked Eisele for a quitclaim deed for a thirty foot strip. Eisele then discovering that he didn't
have one acre of land, tore down the permanent fence which he had
erected and put up a sign on Barnhart's house. Trial court entered
judgment for Barnhart.
HELD: Affirmed. The law is that under certain circumstances, a
boundary line may be permanently and irrevocably established by a
parol agreement of adjoining owners. Where the agreement is executed
and actual possession is taken under such agreement, it is conclusive
against the owners and those claiming under them. The conflicting
evidence in this case was resolved by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff and that is binding on this court.--Judgment affirmed.

DICTA

161

INSURANCE-CONTRACT TERMS-DEFINITION OF WORD "IMMEDI-

ATELY"-George Leonard Reed vs. The Massachusetts Bonding &
Insurance Company, a Corporation-No.13725-Decided Februw

ary 24, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
FACTS: Plaintiff sued upon accident insurance policy issued by
defendant providing for payments in specified amounts in the event that
plaintiff should sustain an injury by accidental means, "if such injury

shall immediately, continuously and wholly disable and prevent the

insured from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his
occupation." The uncontradicted testimony shows that plaintiff sustained an injury by accidental means on August 3, 1933, but was able
to perform the duties pertaining to his occupation until November 23,
1933, when he became wholly disabled and remained so until the date
of the commencement of the action. The medical testimony in the case
was to the effect that the disability followed directly from the accidental
hurt, within such time as the processes of nature consumed in bringing
about the disability. Trial was had to a jury and at the conclusion
of all the evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict, upon the
ground that the evidence affirmatively showed that the disability was
not immediate. The trial court granted the motion and directed a verdict for defendant.
HELD: The word "immediately," as applied to the facts in this
case, is a word of causation and not of time. To hold that the intervening of time while the processes of nature were developing broke the
continuity of the results of the accident, would be equivalent to saying
that no time may be allowed for the development of a disability directly
traceable to an accident. If nature set up these processes instantly after
the accident, as apparently it did in this case, then the disability was
immediate, notwithstanding the fact that it did not disable the insured
until after the lapse of more than 100 days.
The court erred in directing a verdict. The judgment is reversed
and the cause remanded.
Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Burke, and Mr. Justice Bouck
dissent.
ATTACHMENT--GARNISHMENT--CONTRACT FOR WORK-NOTICEANSWER OF GARNISHEE-EFFECT OF-Meyer vs. The Delta

Market-No. 13869-Decided March 16, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Young.
One Martinez became indebted to the Delta Market for groceries.
The Delta Market brought suit and sued out an attachment and served
a garnishee summons on John Clark, his employer. The field man of
the Holly Sugar Company, before the wages were earned, told one
Meyer, a grocer, that if he would let Martinez have groceries the company would write in Meyer's name as a payee on any checks from it to
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Martinez so that Meyer would be protected in the payment for groceries so sold.
1. The Delta Market at the time of the service of the garnishee
summons had a superior right to Meyer and judgment against the
garnishee was properly entered.
2. While there was a contract between the employer and the
sugar company to furnish labor there was no absolute obligation so to
do and there was no evidence that the plaintiff had any notice of any
arrangement to write Meyer's name in the check nor did Martinez
authorize the company to make any checks for money due him payable
to him and Meyer jointly.
3.
There was no agreement on the part of the sugar company to
pay Meyer for groceries furnished to Martinez, of which plaintiff is
required to take cognizance. The employment was directly between
Martinez and his employer and the employer had no agreement with
Meyer to protect him.
4. The trial court had no power to require Meyer to endorse the
check and the check came into existence after the garnishee summons was
served.-Judgment in favor of plaintiff affirmed, except as to that part
in which Meyer is required to endorse the check.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-RESPONSIBILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS-McIntosh vs. The City and
County of Denver-No. 13737-Decided March 16, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
McIntosh was convicted in police court of vagrancy, carrying concealed weapons and impersonating an officer. On appeal to the county
court he was found guilty of vagrancy only upon proceedings in error
in the Supreme Court. Judgment was reversed on the ground that the
evidence was wholly insufficient to sustain the charge. McIntosh then
brought suit against the City and County of Denver for damages for
malicious prosecution. Demurrer was sustained to his complaint on the
ground that the city was not liable for the acts of the officers and
employees.
1. To sustain an action for malicious prosecution, malice and
want of probable cause must concur.
2. The reversal by the Supreme Court of the conviction of vagrancy does not in itself prove want of probable cause. Probable cause
for arrest may exist without sufficient evidence to sustain a charge based
thereon.
3. The city is a corporate entity and as such could entertain no
malicious intent and officers in making the arrest and prosecuting the
case were acting in carrying out their duties of a public nature and not
in the sense that they were agents of the city and the relation of principal and agent under such circumstances does not exist and the city
therefore is not liable for their acts.-Judgment affirmed.
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PRACTICE-TREATING MOTION TO STRIKE AS DEMURRER-STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-LACHES-Barnes vs.

Spangler-No. 13742-Decided March 16, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Vera Spangler was engaged to marry James S. Willard's son. The
son died in 1910 and thereafter Miss Spangler went to live with the
father after the death of his wife, on oral agreement that he would give
her all of his property, and he executed a deed and thereafter his heirs
at law brought suit to cancel the deed on the ground of want of delivery. The court below held there was a valid delivery and on appeal to
the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed on the ground that there
was no valid delivery of the deed with a reservation that Miss Spangler
would not be deprived of any right or remedy against the estate, if any.
The cause was remanded for further proceedings and thereupon the
plaintiffs sought a decree cancelling the deed and awarding them possession and a judgment for the rents and profits to which an amended
answer was filed, more particularly setting out the oral contract whereby
she was to have the possession and ownership of the real estate. Plaintiffs moved to strike the amended answer, which was granted, and judgment was entered in their favor. Thereupon on a second appeal to the
Supreme Court judgment was reversed, holding that the trial court was
in error in striking the amended answer.
On a third trial the stricken amended answer having been reinstated, decree was entered quieting title to Miss Spangler.
1. The law of the case was established by the former decision of
the Supreme Court, it being therein settled that the allegations of the
answer and cross-complaint of defendant were sufficient to entitle her to
offer proof thereof.
2. This being so, nothing remained to be determined except the
truth of her allegations, and this was established to the satisfaction of
the trial court by ample competent evidence; consequently, it must stand.
3.
In determining the sufficiency of defendant's answer and crosscomplaint the Supreme Court considered the motion to strike as a demurrer and since it apparently was so treated, and while not customary,
the practice is permissible to so treat it.
4. The defense of the statute of frauds, the statute of limitations
and the doctrine of laches is not applicable. The alleged oral agreement
was entirely performed by defendant, and the evidence discloses a substantial partial performance by Willard, and an ill-advised attempt on
his part to fully perform. Against contracts in such a state of perform.
ance, the statute does not operate.
5. She was not guilty of laches because she was in possession by
virtue of the deed which she recorded and believed to be good and her
equitable remedy was not available and did not arise until the deed had
been set aside, whereupon came her discovery that Willard had not in a
legal way fully performed. This satisfies the question of laches.
6. The statute of limitations does not apply in an action to quiet

title.--Judgment affirmed.
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TRUSTS-CONVERSION-FOLLOWING FUNDS TO BE IMPRESSED WITH
THE TRUST--CaSS, as Administratrix vs. Blake et al.-No. 13537
-Decided March 16, 1936-Opinion by Mr. JusticeButler.
Maude B. Cass, as administratrix of the estate of Oscar D. Cass,
deceased, brought suit against the defendants in error, as individuals and
as trustees, alleging that the defendants had wrongfully converted certain
funds to which she was entitled, as evidenced by a certain written instrument, and also alleging that the converted funds and their proceeds had
been put in real estate known as the America Theatre property and into
the capital stock of Denver-America Theatre Company. Plaintiff sought
by her complaint to have the real estate and the stock impressed with a
trust. Judgment below held against the plaintiff.
1. Where different inferences may be drawn from the same state
of circumstances, it is the duty of the court to presume in favor of innocent conduct rather than of guilty misconduct or intentional wrong.
2.
Where a transaction is capable, under the evidence, of two
constructions, one that it is fair and honest, the other that it is unfair
or dishonest, the court should give the transaction the former construction.
3.
In this case, the transaction constituted a gift. The transaction being executed, the gift could not be revoked in whole or in part.
4.
The Acceptance Credit Corporation acquired absolute, unqualified title to the investment certificates, freed from all interests and
claims of Cass; that th certificates becarne assets of the company to the
same extent as its other assets; that the company had a lawful right to
use them for corporate purposes.
5. The company's use of the proceeds thereof in the acquisition
of the America Theatre property and the capital stock of Denver-America Theatre Company did not constitute a wrongful conversion of the
certificates and no constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff attached to
that property by reason of such use of the certificates, or the proceeds
thereof.-Judgment affirmed.
PLEADING-ACCOUNTING---MOTION TO STRIKE-DEMURRER-Clavel, as Administratrix v7s. Fougnier-No. 13881-Decided March
16, 1936--Opinio by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

This was suit for an accounting by an administratrix against one
alleged to be holding in trust property belonging to her intestate. The
court below struck portions of the complaint, ordered plaintiff to set

forth more definitely by amendment or bill of particulars the items of
property claimed, and then struck portions of the bill of particulars filed
in compliance with the order, and then sustained a demurrer to the complaint as amended and gave judgment of dismissal.
1. The matter stricken from the complaint as to the first fourteen items was proper, because the eliminated language was by way of

recital only and was not permissible.
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2. As to the remaining allegations stricken, however, these were
direct allegations alleging a trust and a failure to account and should not
have been stricken.
3. The paragraphs of the bill of particulars stricken should have
been retained. Considering the nature of the suit, the alleged relationship of defendant to the matter involved, and the representative capacity
of plaintiff, the excluded allegations were pertinent. They tended to
explain the difficulties under which plaintiff labored in attempting to
comply with the court's order to make the complaint more definite and
certain and they amplify the allegations in the complaint, of which they
became a part. The complaint as amended by the bill of particulars is
free from ambiguity, and states a cause of action. The charge, shortly
stated, is that plaintiff's decedent had given into defendant's keeping in
trust, to be accounted for, substantial properties for which she did not
account while the trustor lived, and that she refuses to account therefor
to the representative of his estate. This stated the cause of action.Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Bouck not participating.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-POWER OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW TO REVERSE THE FINDINGS WITHOUT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE-Mishmish et al. v's. Hayden Coal Com-

pany et al.-No. 13884-Decided March 9, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Young.
Mishmish was awarded $3,640 by the Industrial Commission for
permanent partial disability. The District Court vacated and set aside
the award.
The Industrial Commission first made a finding that the claimant
suffered no permanent disability after a certain date and that any disability after that time was due to miner's consumption and that such
condition had not been aggravated or accelerated by the injury and compensation was denied. On petition for review the Industrial Commission entered a supplemental award for compensation on account of
permanent partial disability, principally on the ground that it had improperly weighed the evidence in its former decision and that its former
order was an error and should be vacated. The question involved is
whether or not the commission acted without and in excess of its powers
in vacating its former award in which it found there was no permanent
injury and entering an award finding permanent injury on the ground
that it improperly weighed the evidence.
1. The reason assigned by the commission in its later award that
it had improperly weighed the evidence in its former award was sufficient ground for entering a new award; particularly where in the former
finding it reserved jurisdiction of the claim until the same was finally
closed.
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The Section 4472, Compiled Laws 1921, does not specifically

provide that additional testimony shall be taken on review.

The evi-

dent purpose of this section is to prevent court dockets from being cumbered with cases before the commission has had full opportunity to correct its own errors. To hold that on such review the commission is

without power to do other than affirm its former finding and award
would be to make the statute meaningless and a review futile.
3. It is the duty of the Industrial Commission as a fact-finding
body to properly weigh the evidence in arriving at its conclusion. If on
a further consideration of the evidence after a petition to review had been
filed they were convinced that they had improperly weighed the evidence, it was their duty to properly weigh the evidence and make findings of fact and enter an award in accordance with such findings.Judgment reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating.
JUDGMENT - CORPORATIONS - FRAUD - APPLICATION OF STOCKHOLDER TO VACATE JUDGMENT-Hartzler vs. Russell Gulch

Smelting Company-No. 13731-Decided March 9, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
A minority stockholder filed a petition to intervene and set aside
a judgment rendered against the corporation, Gold King Mining Company, alleging that the Pittsburg Consolidated Mining Company transferred certain mining claims to the Gold King Mining Company in consideration of 150,000 shares of stock which was the sole consideration,
but in pursuance of the conspiracy and without consideration at the
same time executed and delivered promissory notes aggregating $15,000,
and in furtherance of the conspiracy that the Gold King Mining Company confessed judgment and made no defense and that as a result judgment was entered, execution issued and sale of the Gold King Mining
Company mining claims pursuant to levy had taken place and certificate
to that effect issued.
The trial court dismissed the petition to intervene.
1. Where it is alleged in the petition of intervention that the
notes sued on were without consideration and that those in control of
the sued company failed to defend and actively authorized entry of
judgment and that any request by petitioner upon the controlling agents
of the corporationto defend the action would have been futile, the petitioner should have been permitted to intervene and defend.
2. The allegations in the petition of intervention constituted a
defense to the action if true.
3. The judgment against the Gold King Mining Company
should have been vacated. The execution recalled levy and sale set aside
and leave granted to petitioner to answer and defend the action.
4. The affidavits presented in opposition to the petition are not
material.--Judgmentreversed.

